Skip to main content
Illinois Appellate Court Determines That Dual Awards Under Sections 8(e)18 and 8(d)2 Are Appropriate in American Coal Co. v Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n,
In the recent decision, American Coal v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2024 IL App (5th) 230815WC, the Illinois Appellate Court discussed whether an employee could receive awards under both Section 8(e)18 and 8(d)2. The Appellate Court’s decision leaves employers open to a new type of significant exposure.
On November 5, 2016, the Petitioner in American Coal, suffered injuries to his lumbar spine, hip, abdomen, head (psychological), and blindness in both eyes. At the time of injury, he was 42 years old with five dependents under 18 years old.
Following trial at the arbitration level, the Arbitrator awarded: (1) permanent total disability benefits of $1,008.40/week for life due to 100% loss of use of both eyes under Section 8(e)18 of the Act; (2) permanent partial disability benefits of $775.18/week for 21 weeks for various spinal fracture injuries under Section 8(d)2; and (3) 60% loss of use of the person as a whole for injuries to petitioner’s spine, hip, abdomen, and head (also under Section 8(d)2 of the Act).
The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed the Arbitrator’s decision. The Circuit Court confirmed. Thereafter, the employer appealed to the Appellate Court.
The employer cited Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 364 (2009), in arguing that the Arbitrator’s award under Section 8(e)18 and 8(d)2 resulted in double recovery for Petitioner. The employer also argued that Section 8(e)18 permits an employee to recover for the loss of two members, and for any additional scheduled losses, not non-scheduled losses under Section 8(d)2. Petitioner argued that denying compensation beyond the loss of both eyes would leave him uncompensated for injuries to his hip, spine, abdomen, and head that could further impact his earning capacity.
The Appellate Court rejected Respondent’s argument and held that Section 8(e)18 permits an award of permanent total disability and non-scheduled losses under Section 8(d)2 when such losses result in increased actual disability and further impairment of earning capacity.
Section 8(e)18 states: [t]he specific case of loss of… both eyes, or of any two thereof, or the permanent and complete loss of the use thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the compensation fixed by paragraph (f) of this section. These specific cases of total and permanent disability do not exclude other cases”.
In citing Section 8(e)18, the Appellate Court emphasized the phrase “do not exclude other cases”. The Court stated that the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Beelman Trucking allowed for an award of scheduled losses (and in the American Coal case, non-scheduled losses) in addition to total permanent disability under Section 8(e)18. That is, multiple injuries suffered in a single work accident should not be compensated any differently than losses incurred in two separate accidents.
In Beelman Trucking, the Supreme Court determined that a petitioner could be entitled to compensation under both Sections 8(e)18 and Section 8(e)10. The Appellate Court in American Coal stated that the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of concurrent awards under Section 8(e)18 and non-scheduled losses under Section 8(d)2. Under American Coal, the Appellate Court and the Commission have adopted a liberal interpretation to include non-scheduled losses under Section 8(d)2.
In support of its liberal interpretation, the Appellate Court in American Coal cited to Flynn v. Industrial Comm’n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 556 (2004) and stated that the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers and should be liberally construed to accomplish that objective.
The result seems unfair to the employer. Specifically, if Petitioner is receiving permanent and total disability benefits for life, the question of whether he is partially disabled (whether scheduled or non-scheduled) should be moot. Although we hope that the Courts will limit this type of recovery to catastrophic cases, the Appellate Court unfortunately did not mention that recovery would be limited in any way.