Skip to main content
Illinois Supreme Court Breaks the Time Barrier by Redefining the Limitations on Occupational Disease Claims in Martin v. Goodrich
On January 24, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 820 ILCS 310.1.1 in Martin v. Goodrich.[1] This 2019 amendment to the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (the “Diseases Act”) permits employees, their heirs, and anyone else with standing, to pursue civil suits against employer(s) after expiration of the traditional 25-year statute of repose for occupational disease claims. Section 1.1 reads:
“Sec. 1.1. Permitted civil actions. Subsection (a) of Section 5 and Section 11 do not apply to any injury or death resulting from an occupational disease as to which the recovery of compensation benefits under this Act would be precluded due to the operation of any period of repose or repose provision. As to any such occupational disease, the employee, the employee’s heirs, and any person having standing under the law to bring a civil action at law, including an action for wrongful death and an action pursuant to Section 27-6 of the Probate Act of 1975, has the nonwaivable right to bring such an action against any employer or employers.”
The Illinois legislature enacted this amendment in response to the harsh result of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Folta.[2]
Rodney Martin was a former B.F. Goodrich employee who was exposed to vinyl chloride during his employment with Goodrich Corporation 45 years prior. Martin was later diagnosed with liver cancer in 2019. Following his death in 2020, Martin’s widow, Candice Martin, filed a Wrongful Death and Survival suit in which she specifically referenced Section 1.1 of the Act.
Goodrich argued, however, that the 25-year statute of repose in Section 1(f) precluded claims such as Mrs. Martin’s and that the application of Section 1.1 would violate Goodrich’s due process rights.
In its decision in Martin, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed three main issues: 1) Whether Section 1(f) of the Act constituted a statute of repose; 2) Whether Section 1.1 applied retroactively or prospectively, and 3) Whether application of the exception of Section 1.1 to past conduct violated Illinois due process.
The Illinois Supreme Court first concluded that Section 1(f) functioned as a statute of repose. Through this determination, the Court ultimately ruled that, although Section 1(f)’s purpose is to bar decades-old workers’ compensation claims, the legislative branch intended Section 1.1 to act as an exception that allowed claimants to pursue actions beyond this time limitation.
The Court was next asked to determine whether Section 1.1 applied prospectively. The Court concluded that Section 1.1 constituted a substantive change in Illinois law, meaning it applied only prospectively. Thus, the Court concluded that Section 1.1 only applied to claims that were filed after Section 1.1’s enactment in 2019. Because Mr. Martin’s diagnosis and Mrs. Martin’s commencement of her suit were after Section 1.1’s enactment, the Court concluded that Mrs. Martin’s suit was timely.
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed Goodrich’s due process argument. Goodrich asserted that Section 1.1 unconstitutionally deprived employers of their vested right to a defense to such claim(s) under the Act. The Court rejected Goodrich’s argument, emphasizing that Section 1.1 does not revive claims like Martin’s under the Diseases Act. Rather, the amendment provides an entirely new cause of action. Goodrich’s due process rights were therefore not violated.
The Court then turned their attention to the question of whether Section 1.1 violates the exclusivity provision of the Diseases Act. The Court concluded it did not because such exclusivity is an affirmative defense and not an automatic bar. The Court reasoned that an exclusivity defense only accrues when the underlying cause of action accrues, i.e. when the employee discovers his or her injury. The Court therefore concluded that Goodrich’s due process was not violated because Martin’s claim accrued only after enactment of Section 1.1, and the Court has only applied the amendment prospectively.
Section 1.1 of the Act, and the Court’s decision in Martin, have changed the Diseases Act in two very meaningful ways. First, it has given parties, with standing, an avenue to pursue a recovery that was otherwise time-barred. Second, it has created an exception to the exclusivity provision. Where the only recourse for occupational diseases was the structure of the Act, now such claims can be pursued against employers in civil court – but only when such claims under the Diseases Act are time barred by the 25-year statute of repose.
Illinois employers are not without defenses. Remember that Section 1.1 applies only prospectively after its enactment in 2019. This amendment does not revive old claims. Thus, identifying the applicable exposure and disease manifestation date(s) remains a critical component of any successful handling of such a cause of action. So, if a civil suit is not authorized under Section 1.1, Illinois employers should still enjoy an exclusivity defense. In the same way, Section 1.1 should not authorize civil suits that are still within the jurisdictional allowances of either Section 1(f) or 6 of the Diseases Act.
There are challenges for Illinois’ business community that result from this decision. How will the business community plan for future liabilities now that there is no longer a definitive termination date of liability for latent diseases resulting from harmful chemical exposure? And, who bears the financial burden to pay civil awards arising under Section 1.1 caused by work-related exposure? Unfortunately, these questions remain unanswered, with potential for additional (and significant) exposure for the employer long after a workers’ compensation is closed.
[1] Candice Martin v. Goodrich Corporation, 2025 IL 130509.
[2] Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070. The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s civil claim was time barred by the statute of repose because his mesothelioma manifested nearly 40 years after his last day of work for the Defendant employer.