Skip to main content
Appellate Court Issues New Disfigurement Case in Panda Express v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, Troubling for Employers
The Fourth District Appellate Court of Illinois issued an unpublished decision in Panda Express v Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 Ill. App. (4th) 240771WC-U. The case involved a cook who spilled oil on his feet. The Appellate Court, using methods of statutory construction, found petitioner was entitled to benefits for foot disfigurement based on Section 8(c) of the Act allowing for disfigurement benefits for injuries “in the leg below the knee”.
Petitioner testified that he spilled oil on both feet. The scarring on his right foot was less severe had mostly disappeared, but he had significant scarring on the left foot and ankle. Petitioner also testified to chronic foot pain, and while he was back to work for the Respondent, he testified before the accident he worked a second job he could no longer do.
The Arbitrator found petitioner sustained disfigurement injuries to both feet and his left leg and awarded 58 weeks of disfigurement benefits (10 weeks of disfigurement benefits for the left leg, 3 weeks for the right foot, and 45 weeks for the left foot). The Respondent appealed the decision to the Commission, and the Commission affirmed the decision of the Arbitrator.
The employer appealed again, and the Circuit Court judge found that Petitioner was not entitled to disfigurement benefits because the Act did not authorize benefits for disfiguring injuries to the feet; the judge did not consider the foot to be part of the “leg below the knee”. The judge relied on a medical dictionary definition of leg to reach this conclusion. However, the Court awarded benefits pursuant to Section 8(d)2 of the Act. While Section 8(d)2 states it only applies if an injury is not covered by Section 8(c) or Section 8(e), and Section 8(e)11 includes injuries to the foot, the judge found there was “no evidence petitioner had lost the permanent and complete use of his left foot”, thus 8(e)11 did not apply. Ultimately, the judge found the Commission’s award for disfigurement was improper but an equal award would have been appropriate under Section 8(d)2, thus the Commission decision was affirmed. The employer appealed the decision to the Appellate Court.
The employer argued that the foot should not be included as it was not listed in Section 8(c). The employer also argued that using Section 8(d)2 was inappropriate because Section 8(e) should have been applied. As such, there was no basis for the Circuit Court to reject Section 8(e) just because Petitioner did not lose complete use of the foot. The Appellate Court agreed that Section 8(d)2 did not apply, but found Petitioner qualified for disfigurement benefits.
The Appellate Court analyzed this issue in the context of statutory construction. The Court stated that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to “ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature”, and stated the best indicator of legislative intent was plain language, for which they could look to dictionary definitions.
The Court then provided definitions of a leg from multiple sources. They used a medical source, RX List, as well as Miriam Webster & Britannica, each of which stated the leg included the foot. RX List even explicitly stated “in popular usage”, the leg was defined as a part of body from the top of the thigh down to the foot. The employer provided medical dictionary definitions stating the foot was not part of the leg, which was included in the RX List definition, the court found that legislative intent requires use of common language, not medical terminology. Based on these definitions, the Court found the foot was included in Section 8(c) because it was part of the leg below the knee.
I disagree with the Court’s analysis. Within each subsection of the definitions, the leg usually does not include the foot. I also reviewed the definition of an arm from each of these “dictionaries” as the Act specifically lists both the arm and hand. Each definition of arm included the hand, yet the legislature listed the hand in Section 8(c), not assuming it would be included as “part of the arm”.
The employer made two other arguments at the Appellate Court. First, they argued the exclusion of the term foot from the list of enumerated body parts proved that the legislature did not intend to include the foot. The Court found this theory was a tool of statutory construction that should be resorted to only if the language was ambiguous, and in this case it was unambiguous.
The employer also argued Section 8(e) of the Act separated the foot from the leg, thus the legislature considered them different body parts. However, the Court found that the legislature considered impairment differently than disfigurement, as the level of impairment differs depending on the body part, while disfigurement was equally harmful “wherever it occurs”.
Again, this finding is surprising. Disfigurement is not “equally harmful wherever it occurs” since the legislature did not include the entire body. Additionally, Arbitrators absolutely award different benefits based on the location of disfigurement. A scar across someone’s face that is identical to a scar across someone’s upper arm is going to be worth more.
Overall, even on a basic logical level, the decision is surprising. The body parts included for disfigurement are all commonly viewable when wearing everyday clothes. If the legislature wanted “beach day” to be the standard, they would not have limited benefits to only above the chest. I do not believe the legislative intent was ever to include feet, which are typically covered by shoes. Instead, the Appellate Court has seemingly created a new class of disfigurement liability.
While the effects of this case are very limited (foot disfigurement is now compensable), the case shows how the Appellate Court can construe even the clearest section of the Act in a way more favorable to the Petitioner. The Court claimed that there was “no ambiguity” in rejecting one of the arguments, despite years of contrary understanding and despite the fact that the Court had to compare dictionary definitions to medical definitions. Based on our analysis of Panda Express, it seems that the Court can find ambiguity even in the most unambiguous Sections of the Act, coming at the expense of the employer.